What Can Evolution Tell us About the Healthy Mind? by Dupré, John
	  	   1	  
What	  Can	  Evolution	  Tell	  us	  About	  the	  Healthy	  Mind?	  
In:	  Philosophical	  Issues	  in	  Psychiatry	  III:	  The	  Nature	  and	  Sources	  of	  Historical	  Change,	  eds.	  J.	  Parnas	  
and	  K.	  S.	  Kendler,	  Oxford:	  Oxford	  University	  Press,	  2015,	  pp.	  259-­‐271.	  
	  
John	  Dupré	  
University	  of	  Exeter	  
Introduction	  
	  
Change	  in	  science	  is	  commonly	  thought	  of	  as	  being	  endogenously	  driven.	  	  The	  internal	  logic	  of	  a	  
body	  of	  scientific	  theory	  suggests	  lines	  of	  experimental	  or	  theoretical	  investigation,	  and	  
unanticipated	  results	  of	  such	  investigations	  prompt	  more	  or	  less	  major	  modifications	  to	  the	  
theory.	  	  But	  there	  are	  also	  exogenous	  sources	  of	  change	  from	  quite	  distinct	  and	  sometimes	  distant	  
successful	  theories,	  which	  offer	  new	  ways	  of	  looking	  at	  a	  domain	  or	  findings	  that	  must	  be	  reconciled	  
with	  a	  distinct	  domain.	  	  New	  ways	  of	  doing	  chemistry	  grew	  out	  of	  the	  acceptance	  of	  quantum	  
mechanics,	  for	  example,	  and	  geological	  views	  about	  the	  rates	  of	  geological	  change	  had	  to	  be	  
reconciled	  with	  new	  technologies	  for	  radio-­‐active	  dating.	  
Generally	  this	  kind	  of	  cross-­‐fertilisation	  between	  scientific	  research	  programmes	  should	  be	  seen	  as	  
beneficial.	  	  But	  in	  some	  cases	  it	  can	  be	  less	  benign.	  	  It	  is	  a	  natural	  tendency	  for	  a	  successful	  research	  
programme	  to	  attempt	  to	  apply	  itself	  as	  widely	  as	  possible,	  and	  sometimes	  this	  can	  lead	  to	  attempts	  
to	  colonise	  areas	  of	  enquiry	  for	  which	  it	  is	  poorly	  equipped.	  	  I	  have	  described	  this	  process,	  in	  its	  
worst	  manifestations,	  as	  scientific	  imperialism	  (Dupré	  1994).	  	  The	  power	  and	  generality	  of	  the	  
central	  idea	  of	  natural	  selection	  has	  made	  it	  a	  particularly	  attractive	  base	  for	  such	  imperialism;	  loci	  
classici	  are	  the	  notorious	  aspirations	  to	  colonise	  the	  humanities	  and	  social	  sciences	  in	  E.	  O.	  Wilson’s	  
Sociobiology	  (1975),	  or	  Daniel	  Dennett’s	  conception	  of	  natural	  selection	  as	  a	  universal	  acid	  (Dennett	  
1995),	  capable	  of	  dissolving	  a	  vast	  array	  of	  problems.	  
It	  is	  hardly	  surprising	  that	  attempts	  have	  been	  made	  to	  expand	  the	  scope	  of	  evolutionary	  theory	  to	  
the	  domain	  of	  human	  behaviour,	  a	  project	  initiated	  by	  Darwin	  himself	  in	  The	  Descent	  of	  Man.	  	  Given	  
that	  we	  evolved,	  and	  that	  therefore	  our	  behaviour	  evolved,	  such	  attempts	  are	  surely	  
sensible.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  processes	  through	  which	  our	  behaviour	  evolved	  may	  be	  very	  different	  
from	  those	  responsible	  for	  most	  of	  biological	  evolution;	  and	  biological	  evolution	  itself	  may	  involve	  a	  
wider	  range	  of	  processes	  than	  are	  typically	  given	  much	  weight.	  	  So	  there	  are	  good	  reasons	  why	  these	  
expansionist	  projects	  may	  prove	  unsuccessful.	  	  One	  project	  of	  this	  kind	  that	  has	  been	  particularly	  
prominent	  for	  the	  last	  thirty	  years	  is	  the	  Evolutionary	  Psychology	  associated	  especially	  with	  Leda	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Cosmides	  and	  John	  Tooby	  (see,	  e.g.,	  Barkow,	  Cosmides	  and	  Tooby	  1992).	  	  It	  is	  also,	  according	  to	  
several	  philosophers,	  including	  myself	  (Dupré	  2001),	  a	  deeply	  ill-­‐conceived	  project.	  
Some	  fields	  of	  investigation	  seem	  particularly	  liable	  to	  invite	  contributions	  from	  outside,	  whether	  
beneficial	  or	  malignly	  imperialistic.	  It	  is	  unsurprising	  that	  psychiatry	  should	  be	  such	  a	  field,	  both	  
because	  it	  lacks	  a	  dominant	  paradigm	  equipped	  to	  repel	  invaders,	  and	  because	  the	  complexity	  of	  the	  
phenomena	  it	  addresses	  will	  very	  likely	  benefit	  from	  being	  considered	  from	  multiple	  
perspectives.	  	  As	  papers	  in	  the	  present	  volume	  illustrate,	  fields	  including	  genetics,	  neurophysiology	  
and	  evolution	  have	  volunteered	  to	  reform	  psychiatric	  thinking.	  	  All	  of	  these	  may	  well	  have	  significant	  
contributions	  to	  make,	  though	  almost	  certainly	  less	  extensive	  contributions	  than	  their	  more	  
enthusiastic	  advocates	  suppose.	  	  This	  chapter	  will	  explore	  the	  claims	  of	  Evolutionary	  Psychiatry,	  
derived	  directly	  from	  the	  school	  of	  Evolutionary	  Psychology	  mentioned	  above,	  to	  hold	  the	  key	  to	  a	  
proper	  understanding	  of	  the	  diseases	  of	  the	  mind.	  	  The	  paper	  will	  outline	  the	  deficiencies	  of	  some	  of	  
the	  arguments	  offered	  in	  favour	  of	  this	  reforming	  movement.	  	  More	  generally,	  it	  is	  hoped,	  it	  will	  
provide	  a	  cautionary	  tale	  to	  deter	  excessive	  enthusiasm	  in	  assessing	  such	  offers	  of	  radical	  reform	  
from	  distant	  intellectual	  arenas.	  
Evolution	  and	  the	  Human	  Mind	  
I	  introduce	  the	  substantive	  discussion	  of	  this	  paper	  with	  some	  platitudes.	  First,	  we	  evolved:	  our	  
distant	  ancestors	  were	  much	  simpler	  organisms,	  and	  at	  some	  point	  in	  the	  very	  distant	  past	  there	  are	  
ancestors	  that	  we	  share	  with	  all	  other	  terrestrial	  organisms.	  	  I	  do	  not	  make	  any	  assumptions	  about	  
the	  process	  of	  evolution,	  for	  example	  on	  the	  role	  of	  natural	  selection	  or	  the	  extent	  to	  which	  natural	  
selection	  guarantees	  optimal	  outcomes.	  	  It	  does	  follow	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  we	  evolved,	  however,	  that	  
our	  capacities	  to	  develop	  healthy	  or	  unhealthy	  minds	  are	  products	  of	  our	  evolutionary	  history.	  
What	  does	  not	  follow	  from	  any	  of	  the	  above	  is	  that	  evolutionary	  theory	  will	  be	  useful	  in	  
understanding	  either	  what	  constitutes	  a	  healthy	  mind	  or	  why,	  and	  under	  what	  circumstances,	  our	  
minds	  sometimes	  become	  unhealthy.	  	  There	  are	  at	  least	  two	  reasons	  for	  this.	  	  First,	  our	  concepts	  of	  
health	  and	  disease	  are	  partly	  normative	  concepts.	  	  This	  is	  most	  obviously	  the	  case	  for	  psychological	  
health.	  	  At	  some	  historical	  periods	  homosexuality,	  for	  instance,	  was	  taken	  to	  be	  a	  disease;	  moral	  
reflection	  and	  political	  action	  have	  subsequently	  overturned	  this	  categorisation.	  	  This	  is	  not	  to	  deny	  
that	  there	  is	  an	  organic	  basis	  for	  many	  mental	  disorders	  or	  traits	  (homosexuality	  might	  in	  principle	  
turn	  out	  to	  have	  a	  systematic	  neurological	  cause),	  nor	  that	  some	  organic	  conditions	  can	  produce	  
conditions	  that	  would	  be	  drastically	  debilitating	  in	  any	  imaginable	  society.	  	  It	  is	  rather	  a	  reminder	  
that	  in	  attempting	  to	  understand	  a	  psychiatric	  disorder	  we	  should	  always	  be	  prepared	  to	  ask	  why	  
this	  condition	  is	  judged	  pathological.	  	  In	  some	  cases,	  no	  doubt,	  the	  answer	  will	  be	  obvious.	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The	  normativity	  of	  at	  least	  some	  kinds	  of	  psychopathology	  is	  hardly	  controversial.	  	  Continuing	  the	  
previous	  illustration,	  it	  was	  not	  that	  long	  ago	  homosexuality	  was	  considered	  both	  a	  disease	  and	  a	  
crime.	  	  It	  was	  then	  hazardous	  to	  be	  homosexual—leading	  to	  disastrous	  outcomes	  such	  as	  
incarceration—and	  even	  today	  it	  exposes	  people	  to	  dangers	  from	  social	  discrimination	  and	  the	  
violence	  of	  homophobic	  gangs.	  	  This	  observation	  points	  to	  the	  second	  problem	  I	  want	  to	  stress	  for	  
evolutionary	  approaches	  to	  the	  pathological:	  pathology	  is	  a	  relation	  between	  an	  organism	  and	  an	  
environment	  not,	  in	  general,	  an	  intrinsic	  feature	  of	  an	  organism.	  Although,	  as	  noted	  above,	  there	  are	  
conditions	  that	  would	  very	  probably	  be	  considered	  pathological	  in	  just	  about	  any	  imaginable	  society,	  
these	  constitute	  a	  limiting	  case	  rather	  than	  the	  paradigm.	  There	  is	  a	  sense	  in	  which	  homosexuality	  
really	  is	  a	  pathology	  in	  a	  homophobic	  society:	  it	  is	  a	  dangerous	  and	  unhealthy	  behavioural	  
disposition,	  though	  the	  danger	  derives	  not	  from	  any	  inherent	  features	  of	  the	  trait,	  but	  from	  the	  
behaviour	  it	  may	  precipitate	  in	  others.	  	  	  
We	  might	  also	  consider	  the	  suggestion	  deriving	  from	  Foucault	  that	  homosexuals,	  as	  a	  class	  of	  people	  
with	  a	  particular	  distinguishing	  characteristic,	  are	  a	  social	  construct.	  	  Where	  once	  homosexual	  acts	  
were	  just	  a	  behaviour	  that	  many	  or	  most	  people	  engaged	  in	  on	  occasion,	  they	  were	  gradually	  
interpreted	  as	  the	  symptoms	  identifying	  a	  special	  kind	  of	  person,	  or	  a	  pathology	  afflicting	  an	  
unfortunate	  or	  sinful	  minority.	  	  While	  not	  forgetting	  that	  there	  are	  people	  with	  massive	  cognitive	  
deficits	  that	  impair	  their	  functioning	  in	  any	  imaginable	  society,	  psychiatry	  is	  often	  concerned	  with	  
more	  subtle	  mismatches	  between	  individual	  behaviour	  and	  social	  norms.	  Much	  psychopathology	  can	  
be,	  to	  a	  greater	  or	  lesser	  extent,	  partly	  constructed	  by	  these	  norms.	  This	  is	  nicely	  illustrated	  by	  Ian	  
Hacking’s	  discussion	  (this	  volume)	  of	  the	  conditions	  under	  which	  (some)	  autistic	  people	  can	  lead	  
worthwhile	  lives.	  	  My	  point	  here	  is	  not	  to	  promote	  general	  scepticism	  about	  psychopathology	  but	  
only	  to	  recall	  the	  quite	  familiar	  difficulty	  of	  saying	  what	  it	  is,	  what	  its	  various	  manifestations	  are,	  and	  
what	  are	  the	  conditions,	  internal	  and	  external	  to	  the	  patient,	  that	  make	  these	  manifestations	  
pathological.	  	  This	  is	  important	  for	  understanding	  the	  difficulties	  with	  evolutionary	  approaches	  to	  
the	  subject	  that	  will	  be	  the	  main	  topic	  of	  this	  paper.	  
Is	  evolution	  the	  key	  to	  understanding	  human	  behaviour?	  
While	  evolutionary	  theory	  has	  had	  extraordinary	  successes	  in	  explaining	  biological	  phenomena,	  it	  is	  
quite	  another	  matter	  to	  use	  it	  to	  predict,	  to	  tell	  us	  what	  organisms	  must	  be	  like	  ahead	  of	  our	  
empirical	  discovery	  that	  they	  are	  or	  are	  not	  like	  that.	  Advocates	  of	  an	  evolutionary	  approach	  to	  
psychiatry	  do	  not	  merely	  point	  to	  a	  well-­‐understood	  phenomenon,	  say	  schizophrenia,	  and	  explain	  
how	  it	  came	  about.	  	  Given	  the	  limitations	  of	  our	  understanding	  of	  the	  mind	  it	  is	  inevitable	  that	  a	  
general	  theory	  of	  its	  origin	  and	  function	  will	  reshape	  the	  categories	  in	  which	  we	  think	  about	  the	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mental.	  Evolutionary	  theorists	  indeed	  do	  propose	  that	  reflection	  on	  the	  evolutionary	  origins	  of	  our	  
psychopathologies	  will	  help	  us	  to	  understand	  what	  these	  are,	  and	  even	  whether	  they	  are	  
pathological.	  	  What	  they	  propose	  is,	  therefore,	  often	  more	  like	  prediction	  than	  explanation.	  	  
There	  are	  several	  grounds	  for	  scepticism	  about	  this	  general	  project.	  	  Evolution	  is	  an	  extremely	  
complex	  process,	  the	  upshot	  of	  processes	  of	  many	  different	  kinds,	  and	  the	  nature	  and	  importance	  of	  
these	  is	  by	  no	  means	  fully	  understood	  (Dupré	  2012,	  Ch.	  9;	  Gould	  and	  Lewontin	  1979).	  	  	  Moreover,	  if	  
there	  is	  one	  feature	  that	  most	  clearly	  distinguishes	  human	  behaviour,	  it	  is	  its	  plasticity.	  	  Of	  course,	  
this	  plasticity	  evolved.	  	  But	  what	  is	  part	  of	  the	  normal	  scope	  of	  this	  evolved	  plasticity,	  and	  what	  lies	  
beyond	  it	  in	  the	  realm	  of	  the	  abnormal	  or	  pathological,	  becomes	  a	  difficult,	  perhaps	  even	  
incoherent,	  question.	  At	  any	  rate,	  behavioural	  plasticity	  makes	  it	  easy	  to	  understand	  how	  the	  realm	  
of	  the	  normal	  may	  be	  an	  evolving	  function	  of	  the	  social	  environment	  as	  much	  or	  more	  than	  an	  
intrinsic	  feature	  of	  the	  individual.	  With	  these	  concerns	  in	  mind,	  I	  turn	  to	  the	  claims	  made	  by	  
advocates	  of	  evolutionary	  psychiatry	  for	  the	  relevance	  of	  their	  approach.	  	  Perhaps	  the	  best	  known	  
such	  advocate	  is	  Randolph	  Nesse.	  	  	  
Nesse	  on	  the	  proper	  functioning	  of	  the	  emotions.	  
The	  evolutionary	  approach	  to	  psychiatric	  issues	  is	  well	  illustrated	  by	  Nesse’s	  treatment	  of	  emotional	  
disorders	  (Nesse	  and	  Jackson	  2006).	  	  Nesse	  and	  Jackson’s	  starting	  point	  is	  that	  we	  need	  evolutionary	  
insight	  to	  understand	  why	  the	  emotions	  exist	  at	  all	  and	  hence	  what	  their	  proper	  functions	  are.	  	  Only	  
from	  this	  perspective	  can	  we	  provide	  a	  proper	  taxonomy	  of	  emotions,	  realising	  for	  example	  that	  
sadness,	  depression	  or	  anxiety	  may	  have	  different	  evolutionarily	  derived	  functions.	  	  Identification	  of	  
these	  functions,	  in	  turn,	  can	  show	  us	  that	  some	  distressing	  emotions	  are	  normal	  given	  their	  
occurrence	  in	  circumstances	  for	  which	  they	  are	  appropriate.	  	  This	  realisation	  will	  enable	  the	  
avoidance	  of	  false	  positives	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  inappropriate	  attempts	  to	  treat	  normal,	  functional	  
emotional	  states.	  	  More	  generally,	  the	  evolutionary	  perspective	  is	  required	  if	  we	  are	  to	  analyse	  the	  
motivational	  structure	  of	  an	  individual’s	  life.	  	  	  
I	  offer	  no	  opinion	  on	  whether	  Nesse	  and	  Jackson’s	  evolutionary	  reflections	  may	  have	  provided	  
valuable	  insights	  into	  emotional	  disorders.	  	  Nevertheless,	  the	  path	  by	  which	  they	  have	  reached	  them	  
is	  problematic.	  	  First,	  as	  already	  noted,	  inferring	  how	  something	  evolved	  presupposes	  knowing	  what	  
it	  is	  that	  evolved.	  It	  is	  not	  now	  possible,	  and	  very	  probably	  never	  will	  be	  possible,	  to	  infer	  what	  
features	  an	  organism	  must	  have	  from	  reflection	  on	  its	  evolutionary	  history.	  	  So	  whether	  sadness,	  
depression	  and	  anxiety	  are	  importantly	  different	  states	  is	  a	  question	  for	  empirical	  investigation	  of	  
contemporary	  humans,	  not	  for	  theoretical	  evolutionary	  speculation.	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A	  second	  difficulty	  is	  the	  omnipresence	  of	  exaptation,	  the	  adaptation	  of	  traits	  evolved	  to	  serve	  one	  
function	  to	  entirely	  different	  uses.	  The	  fact	  that	  lungs	  evolved	  from	  structures	  that	  served	  to	  keep	  
our	  fishy	  ancestors	  afloat	  doesn’t	  imply	  that	  our	  present	  lungs	  are	  really	  flotation	  devices.	  	  This	  is	  a	  
general	  problem	  with	  evolutionary	  accounts	  of	  function,	  which	  has	  led	  philosophers	  to	  the	  ‘recent	  
history’	  account	  of	  function,	  the	  idea	  that	  function	  is	  what	  currently	  maintains	  or	  has	  recently	  
maintained	  a	  trait	  in	  a	  population	  (Godfrey-­‐Smith	  1994).	  	  The	  plasticity	  of	  human	  behaviour	  makes	  it	  
plausible	  that	  exaptation	  could	  happen	  on	  a	  very	  short	  time	  scale,	  so	  that	  identifying	  what	  
evolutionary	  psychologists	  refer	  to	  as	  the	  ‘environment	  of	  evolutionary	  adaptation’	  (see	  further	  
discussion	  below)	  becomes	  an	  extremely	  difficult	  task.	  
Given	  these	  problems,	  it	  is	  no	  surprise	  that	  the	  possibility	  of	  inferring	  the	  functional	  organisation	  of	  
individuals	  from	  evolutionary	  reflection	  is	  typically	  grounded	  in	  simplistic	  and	  increasingly	  outdated	  
ideas	  about	  evolution.	  	  Here	  are	  two	  indicative	  quotes,	  again	  from	  Nesse	  (2008):	  
	  “biologists	  have	  known	  for	  decades	  that	  selection	  is	  much	  stronger	  at	  the	  level	  of	  the	  individual,	  so	  
benefits	  to	  groups	  are	  rarely	  substantial.”	  
“There	  is	  no	  single	  normal	  genome,	  there	  are	  just	  genes,	  some	  of	  which	  have	  been	  more	  successful	  
than	  others	  in	  making	  bodies	  that	  survive	  to	  reproduce.”	  
Both	  of	  these	  statements	  are	  highly	  contentious.	  	  While	  group	  selection	  became	  very	  unfashionable	  
in	  the	  1970s	  and	  80s,	  especially	  under	  the	  influence	  of	  Williams	  (1966)	  and	  the	  very	  successful	  
popularisation	  of	  Williams’s	  views	  by	  Dawkins	  (1976),	  more	  recently	  the	  issue	  has	  become	  far	  more	  
open	  (Sober	  and	  Wilson	  1998).	  	  Notoriously,	  group	  selection	  has	  recently	  been	  strongly	  endorsed	  by	  
E.	  O.	  Wilson	  (2012),	  the	  founder	  of	  sociobiology	  (Wilson	  1975),	  the	  intellectual	  ancestor	  of	  
Evolutionary	  Psychology.	  	  Needless	  to	  say,	  perhaps,	  the	  question	  of	  group	  selection	  is	  of	  central	  
relevance	  to	  human	  behaviour,	  much	  of	  which	  is	  undoubtedly	  directed	  at	  developing	  and	  
maintaining	  cohesion	  and	  cooperation	  within	  groups,	  whether	  or	  not	  that	  is	  the	  evolutionary	  
explanation	  of	  its	  existence.	  	  	  
The	  status	  of	  genes	  is	  also	  a	  matter	  of	  intense	  debate	  among	  philosophers	  of	  biology	  (Stotz	  and	  
Griffiths	  2013).	  	  An	  uncontentious	  point	  is	  that	  the	  behaviour	  of	  genes,	  whatever	  exactly	  these	  are,	  is	  
always	  dependent	  on	  many	  aspects	  of	  their	  cellular	  context,	  including	  other	  features	  of	  the	  genome.	  	  
Arguably	  the	  genome	  is	  a	  much	  less	  theoretically	  problematic	  entity	  than	  the	  gene	  (Barnes	  and	  
Dupré	  2008).	  	  Certainly	  there	  is	  no	  normal	  genome	  if	  that	  is	  taken	  to	  mean	  some	  precise	  sequence	  of	  
nucleotides;	  but	  there	  is	  a	  great	  deal	  more	  to	  a	  genome	  than	  a	  sequence	  of	  nucleotides.	  	  And	  in	  fact	  
equally,	  there	  surely	  are	  abnormal,	  or	  at	  least	  pathological,	  genomes,	  for	  example	  trisomies	  such	  as	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that	  which	  results	  in	  Down	  syndrome.	  	  There	  are	  invariably	  pathological	  genes,	  for	  example	  the	  
extended	  trinucelotide	  repeat	  that	  causes	  Huntington’s	  disease,	  though	  this	  might	  equally	  well	  be	  
seen	  as	  a	  genomic	  pathology.	  Most	  potentially	  harmful	  genes	  are	  only	  abnormal,	  however,	  in	  the	  
sense	  of	  having	  harmful	  effects,	  in	  specific	  genomic	  contexts.	  	  As	  is	  a	  familiar	  finding	  from	  classical	  
genetics,	  many	  recessive	  deleterious	  genes,	  genes	  that	  are	  harmful	  in	  the	  homozygous	  state,	  may	  be	  
beneficial	  as	  heterozygotes.	  
My	  point	  here	  is	  not	  to	  develop	  an	  argument	  in	  favour	  of	  one	  position	  or	  other	  on	  these	  
controversial	  and	  difficult	  questions,	  but	  to	  point	  out	  that	  evolutionary	  theory	  is	  in	  a	  dynamic	  and	  
rapidly	  changing	  state,	  and	  that	  to	  take	  it	  as	  a	  firm	  body	  of	  established	  principles	  from	  which	  
conclusions	  can	  be	  drawn	  in	  other	  equally	  difficult	  and	  contentious	  domains,	  is	  highly	  problematic	  
(Dupré	  2012,	  Ch.,	  9).	  
Evolutionary	  Psychology	  and	  Evolutionary	  Psychiatry	  
Many	  attempts	  to	  apply	  evolutionary	  thinking	  to	  psychiatry	  follow	  closely	  the	  programme	  of	  
evolutionary	  psychology	  often	  referred	  to	  as	  the	  Santa	  Barbara	  school,	  associated	  especially	  with	  
Leda	  Cosmides	  and	  John	  Tooby	  (Barkow,	  Cosmides	  and	  Tooby	  1992;	  Buss	  1999).	  	  Because	  there	  is	  an	  
uncontroversial	  sense	  in	  which	  there	  must	  in	  principle	  be	  some	  legitimate	  study	  of	  evolutionary	  
psychology—since	  humans	  evolved,	  their	  psychology	  must	  have	  evolved—it	  has	  become	  common	  to	  
refer	  to	  the	  specific	  approach	  of	  the	  Santa	  Barbara	  School	  as	  Evolutionary	  Psychology	  (capitalized),	  a	  
convention	  I	  shall	  follow	  here.	  Unfortunately	  Evolutionary	  Psychology	  suffers	  from	  serious	  
deficiencies,	  including	  the	  general	  problems	  sketched	  in	  the	  last	  section	  (Dupré	  2001;	  Buller	  2005).	  	  
In	  this	  section	  I	  shall	  briefly	  describe	  Evolutionary	  Psychology,	  and	  the	  Evolutionary	  Psychiatry	  that	  
derives	  from	  it,	  and	  point	  towards	  some	  of	  their	  failings.	  	  This	  will	  lead,	  in	  the	  next	  section,	  to	  some	  
suggestions	  about	  a	  more	  adequate	  way	  of	  thinking	  about	  human	  nature	  and,	  thus,	  its	  possible	  
pathologies.	  	  
Representative	  applications	  of	  Evolutionary	  Psychology	  to	  Psychiatry	  include	  a	  general	  treatment	  by	  
Anthony	  Stevens	  and	  John	  Price	  (2000)	  and	  a	  more	  specific	  treatment	  of	  depression	  by	  Keedwell	  
(2008).	  	  In	  briefest	  outline,	  these	  works	  take	  psychopathology	  to	  consist	  of	  a	  misfit	  between	  a	  
universal	  evolved	  human	  nature	  and	  the	  actual	  (social)	  conditions	  of	  an	  individual.	  The	  contribution	  
from	  Evolutionary	  Psychology	  is	  that	  human	  nature	  is	  to	  be	  discerned	  by	  reflection	  on	  a	  particular	  
phase	  of	  evolutionary	  history,	  the	  Pleistocene,	  approximately	  the	  two	  million	  years	  preceding	  the	  
Holocene,	  roughly	  the	  last	  11,000	  years.	  	  During	  this	  period,	  according	  to	  Evolutionary	  Psychologists,	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humans	  evolved	  a	  large	  number	  of	  specialised	  mental	  modules	  designed	  to	  deal	  with	  the	  problems	  
posed	  by	  the	  natural	  and	  social	  environment	  of	  that	  time	  period.	  
Here	  is	  how	  Stevens	  and	  Price	  describe	  our	  general	  predicament:	  
From	  a	  biological	  point	  of	  view,	  the	  ultimate	  purpose	  of	  our	  existence	  is	  the	  perpetuation	  of	  our	  
genes.	  	  The	  transmission	  of	  our	  genes	  to	  the	  next	  generation	  is	  the	  ultimate	  cause	  of	  our	  behaviour.	  	  
The	  archetypal	  propensities	  with	  which	  we	  are	  endowed	  are	  adapted	  to	  enable	  us	  to	  survive	  long	  
enough	  in	  the	  environment	  in	  which	  we	  evolved	  (“the	  environment	  of	  evolutionary	  adaptedness”)	  to	  
give	  our	  genes	  a	  fair	  chance	  of	  transmission	  to	  our	  offspring”	  (Stevens	  and	  Price,	  p.	  11;	  emphasis	  in	  
original).	  
And	  here	  is	  why	  this	  leads	  to	  psychological	  disorder:	  
“cultural	  development	  now	  occurs	  too	  quickly	  for	  genes	  to	  adapt,	  resulting	  in	  a	  split	  between	  our	  
genes	  and	  our	  lifestyles;	  this	  mismatch	  ...	  can	  bring	  about	  illness”	  ...	  “the	  brain	  is	  a	  physical	  structure	  
...	  and	  one	  that	  has	  been	  under	  genetic	  control”	  (Keedwell,	  pp.	  6-­‐7)	  
I,	  and	  others,	  have	  offered	  extensive	  criticism	  of	  the	  general	  picture	  assumed	  in	  these	  quotes,	  and	  I	  
won’t	  try	  to	  rehearse	  these	  in	  any	  detail	  here	  (Dupré	  2001;	  Buller	  2005).	  	  One	  central	  point	  is	  that,	  as	  
is	  standard	  in	  Evolutionary	  Psychology,	  development	  is	  not	  highlighted—emphasis	  is	  on	  dispositions	  
that	  develop	  similarly	  in	  the	  Stone	  Age	  and	  a	  modern	  city,	  i.e.	  are	  genetically	  determined	  
independent	  of	  any	  external	  developmental	  contingencies.	  	  Stevens	  and	  Price	  elaborate	  this	  in	  terms	  
of	  Jungian	  archetypes	  and	  though	  these	  are	  no	  doubt	  controversial,	  I	  don’t	  think	  their	  peculiarities	  
are	  essential	  to	  the	  argument	  beyond	  proposing	  developmental	  trajectories	  that	  are	  evolutionarily	  
selected	  and	  genetically	  determined.	  	  
Of	  course	  both	  Evolutionary	  Psychologists	  and	  their	  psychiatric	  followers	  universally	  deny	  that	  their	  
doctrines	  embody	  genetic	  determinism.	  And	  of	  course	  this	  is	  quite	  correct	  if	  determinism	  is	  taken	  to	  
deny	  any	  interaction	  between	  goals,	  drives,	  needs,	  etc.	  and	  the	  environment.	  But	  the	  basic	  goals	  are	  
given:	  ‘psychopathology	  results	  when	  the	  environment	  fails	  …	  to	  meet	  one	  (or	  more)	  archetypal	  
need(s)	  in	  the	  developing	  individual’	  (Stevens	  and	  Price,	  2000,	  p.	  34).	  	  At	  the	  very	  least	  these	  
archetypal	  needs	  are	  seen	  as	  developmentally	  deeply	  entrenched	  and	  hard	  to	  deflect.	  
Against	  Atavism	  
The	  views	  I	  have	  been	  describing	  see	  human	  behavioural	  dispositions	  as	  atavistic.	  Though	  of	  course	  
we	  may	  often	  manage	  to	  adjust	  our	  behaviour	  to	  the	  exigencies	  of	  modern	  life,	  the	  dispositions	  from	  
which	  we	  begin	  are	  designed	  for	  the	  very	  different	  conditions	  of	  the	  Stone	  Age.	  I	  have	  criticised	  this	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idea	  in	  some	  detail	  elsewhere	  (Dupré	  2012,	  Ch.	  14),	  and	  I	  shall	  not	  rehearse	  the	  arguments	  in	  detail	  
here.	  	  The	  key	  point	  is	  that	  the	  thesis	  of	  atavism	  is	  based	  on	  assumptions	  about	  the	  rate	  of	  
evolution.	  	  Evolution	  is	  understood	  as	  involving	  random	  changes	  in	  genomes	  and	  selection	  of	  any	  
that	  prove	  to	  be	  beneficial,	  and	  this	  is	  taken	  to	  be	  far	  too	  slow	  a	  process	  to	  result	  in	  significant	  
changes	  in	  the	  short	  time	  period	  since	  the	  Pleistocene.	  	  But	  this	  is	  a	  quite	  inadequate	  account	  of	  
human	  evolution.	  	  Changes	  in	  human	  behaviour	  can	  be	  brought	  about,	  and	  passed	  on	  to	  
descendants,	  by	  a	  variety	  of	  processes,	  notably	  cultural	  and	  epigenetic,	  that	  can	  operate	  on	  much	  
shorter	  timescales.	  	  In	  the	  following	  sections	  I	  shall	  give	  some	  indications	  of	  how	  this	  can	  work,	  and	  
how	  it	  wholly	  undermines	  the	  programme	  of	  Evolutionary	  Psychology	  and	  its	  offspring	  in	  Psychiatry.	  
Genetic	  vs.	  Cultural	  Causes	  of	  Human	  Behaviour	  
Notoriously,	  there	  is	  a	  good	  deal	  of	  mudslinging	  in	  debates	  over	  human	  nature,	  with	  opposing	  camps	  
hurling	  accusations	  of	  genetic	  and	  cultural	  determinism.	  We	  can	  begin	  to	  move	  beyond	  these	  stark	  
oppositions	  by	  noting	  a	  fundamental	  point	  about	  scientific	  explanation.	  In	  contrast	  with	  the	  grand	  
theories	  espoused	  by	  an	  earlier	  generation,	  contemporary	  philosophers	  of	  science	  see	  explanation,	  
at	  least	  in	  the	  social	  and	  biological	  sciences,	  as	  deriving	  from	  various	  kinds	  of	  models	  (Bailer-­‐Jones	  
2009;	  Morgan	  and	  Morrison	  2000).	  	  All	  models	  provide	  only	  partial	  representations	  of	  the	  real	  
systems	  that	  are	  their	  targets.	  Certain	  features	  are	  highlighted	  and	  others	  ignored.	  	  This	  enables	  the	  
understanding	  of	  important	  tendencies	  or	  capacities	  of	  real	  systems,	  but	  in	  the	  open	  real	  world	  
contexts	  in	  which	  living	  systems	  reside,	  scientific	  models	  cannot	  provide	  universally	  reliable	  
predictions.	  
Given	  this	  basic	  point	  we	  might	  conclude	  that	  both	  genetic	  ‘determinist’	  and	  cultural	  ‘determinist’	  
models	  were	  perfectly	  legitimate	  scientific	  tools.	  	  Up	  to	  a	  point	  this	  is	  correct.	  	  However,	  first,	  
advocates	  of	  models	  of	  both	  kinds	  are	  sometimes	  inclined	  to	  what	  I	  have	  called	  scientific	  
imperialism,	  the	  view	  that	  their	  favourite	  tools	  are	  far	  more	  widely	  applicable	  than	  they	  really	  are	  
(Dupré	  1994).	  	  (If	  you	  have	  a	  hammer,	  everything	  looks	  like	  a	  nail.)	  	  Second,	  and	  more	  important,	  in	  
human	  development	  biological	  and	  cultural	  factors	  are	  almost	  invariably	  so	  deeply	  intertwined	  that	  
a	  one-­‐sided	  model	  is	  almost	  inevitably	  misleading.	  But	  finally,	  as	  I	  shall	  argue	  shortly,	  there	  are	  good	  
reasons	  for	  paying	  more	  attention	  to	  cultural	  models.	  
One	  area	  where	  the	  atavistic	  perspective	  described	  in	  the	  preceding	  section	  might	  seem	  especially	  
attractive	  is	  that	  of	  phobias.	  The	  dangers	  posed	  today	  by	  snakes	  and	  spiders	  are	  trivial	  compared	  to,	  
say,	  cars	  or	  electric	  outlets.	  	  Yet	  the	  former	  are	  much	  more	  frequent	  subjects	  of	  phobia.	  	  It	  is	  hard	  to	  
resist	  the	  conclusion	  that	  some	  atavistic	  predispositions	  are	  at	  work	  here.	  	  On	  the	  other	  hand	  there	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are	  also	  distinctively	  modern	  phobias,	  such	  as	  going	  to	  school	  or	  to	  the	  dentist,	  or	  of	  contracting	  
AIDS.	  According	  to	  Stevens	  and	  Price	  (2000,	  pp.	  103-­‐4.)	  ‘[these]	  are	  contemporary	  versions	  of	  going	  
off	  the	  home	  range,	  getting	  hurt,	  or	  of	  getting	  infected’.	  Perhaps.	  But	  this	  is	  then	  looking	  a	  
disturbingly	  Procrustean	  or	  even	  Panglossian	  programme.	  (If	  you	  have	  a	  hammer…)	  
Surely	  a	  better	  way	  to	  understand	  this	  case	  is	  to	  see	  an	  interaction	  of	  biological,	  evolved	  tendencies	  
with	  environmental	  factors	  that	  can	  lead	  to	  a	  wide	  variety	  of	  more	  or	  less	  pathological	  outcomes.	  	  
Learning	  what	  to	  be	  afraid	  of	  is,	  presumably,	  an	  important	  part	  of	  development,	  and	  one	  that	  
undoubtedly	  depends	  on	  both	  biological	  capacities	  and	  environmental	  inputs	  (learning	  of	  various	  
kinds).	  Sometimes	  this	  fear	  is	  disproportionate,	  and	  sometimes	  it	  is	  directed	  at	  largely	  inappropriate	  
objects,	  perhaps	  for	  reasons	  of	  phylogenetic	  inertia.	  There	  are	  no	  dangerous	  spiders	  where	  I	  live,	  but	  
perhaps	  they	  were	  a	  serious	  threat	  to	  many	  generations	  of	  my	  ancestors.	  
A	  more	  complex	  example	  will	  show	  why	  generally	  we	  should	  be	  more	  interested	  in	  cultural	  
determinants	  of	  behaviour.	  Stevens	  and	  Price	  divide	  the	  fundamental	  goals	  of	  human	  life	  shaped	  by	  
our	  Stone	  Age	  history	  into	  those	  concerned	  with	  rank	  and	  with	  attachment.	  	  Rank,	  or	  status,	  
provides	  access	  to	  resources	  of	  all	  kinds,	  but	  especially	  mates.	  	  Attachment,	  cooperative	  relations	  
with	  other	  humans,	  provides	  allies	  and	  again	  mates.	  	  They	  remark	  that	  “The	  commitment	  of	  social	  
scientists	  to	  ...	  cultural	  relativity	  and	  behavioural	  plasticity	  ...	  has	  meant	  that	  the	  universal	  
importance	  attributed	  to	  rank	  and	  status	  in	  human	  societies	  has	  been	  largely	  overlooked”	  (2000,	  p.	  
25).	  Knowing	  a	  few	  social	  scientists,	  I	  found	  this	  comment	  extraordinary.	  	  I’m	  inclined	  to	  say,	  rather,	  
that	  the	  commitment	  of	  evolutionary	  psychologists	  to	  natural	  selection	  and	  reproductive	  success	  
has	  meant	  that	  the	  universal	  importance	  attributed	  to	  rank	  and	  status	  by	  social	  scientists	  has	  been	  
largely	  overlooked.	  Status	  is	  a	  (or	  the)	  fundamental	  organising	  concept	  for	  much	  of	  social	  science.	  
There	  is	  an	  important	  point	  here	  beyond	  the	  mud-­‐slinging.	  While	  it	  may	  be	  true	  and	  important	  that	  a	  
generalised	  drive	  to	  achieve	  high	  status	  can	  be	  found	  in	  the	  great	  majority	  of	  humans,	  the	  
implications	  that	  this	  has	  in	  any	  particular	  human	  society	  are	  enormously	  more	  complex	  and	  
interesting	  than	  the	  identification	  of	  such	  an	  allegedly	  general	  drive.	  	  And	  the	  implications	  in	  a	  
particular	  complex	  modern	  society	  are	  quite	  different	  from	  those	  in	  a	  particular	  hunter-­‐gatherer	  
society.	  	  It	  is	  perhaps	  because	  of	  this	  that	  social	  scientists	  have	  been	  interested	  in	  the	  diversity	  of	  
social	  contexts	  more	  than	  the	  possible	  universality	  of	  very	  basic	  human	  goals.	  	  No	  one	  is	  likely	  to	  
deny	  that	  sex	  is	  a	  very	  widespread	  human	  goal,	  but	  it	  does	  not	  follow,	  nor	  is	  it	  true,	  that	  the	  
implications	  of	  this	  are	  the	  same	  in	  Los	  Angeles,	  Teheran,	  and	  Beijing.	  	  	  
	  	   10	  
At	  any	  rate,	  the	  division	  of	  labour	  provides	  a	  foundation	  for	  all	  human	  societies,	  is	  a	  central	  feature	  
that	  distinguishes	  one	  society	  from	  another,	  and	  provides	  a	  range	  of	  crucial	  differentiations	  within	  
any	  society	  by	  giving	  rise	  to	  multiple,	  often	  cross-­‐cutting	  status	  groups.	  Occupational	  status	  groups	  
determined	  by	  the	  division	  of	  labour	  are	  cross-­‐cut	  by	  countless	  other	  status	  groupings:	  race,	  gender,	  
class,	  caste;	  nerds,	  geeks,	  skinheads,	  Guardian	  readers.	  	  As,	  e.g.,	  Bourdieu	  (1984)	  has	  elegantly	  
demonstrated,	  status	  is	  also	  acquired	  and	  confirmed	  by	  a	  multitude	  of	  matters	  of	  taste	  and	  style.	  	  
The	  fact	  that	  people	  seek	  status,	  at	  least	  within	  a	  more	  or	  less	  narrow	  group	  to	  which	  they	  belong	  is	  
a	  necessary	  background	  to	  the	  interest	  in	  considering	  these	  various	  sources	  of	  status.	  	  But	  if	  one	  in	  
interested	  in	  how	  people	  actually	  behave	  there	  is	  no	  substitute	  for	  mapping	  the	  complex	  and	  
intersecting	  paths	  to	  multiple	  different	  kinds	  of	  status	  in	  particular	  societies.	  	  In	  the	  present	  context	  
it	  is	  surely	  these	  that	  must	  be	  understood	  if	  we	  are	  to	  discern	  the	  frustrations	  that	  the	  attempt	  to	  
follow	  these	  winding	  paths	  can	  engender,	  and	  which	  can,	  in	  extreme	  cases,	  lead	  to	  mental	  illness.	  
Social	  scientists	  are	  surely	  right	  to	  resist	  the	  reduction	  of	  this	  complexity	  to	  the	  quest	  for	  
reproductive	  success.	  
Developmental	  Systems	  Theory	  
A	  much	  more	  useful	  approach	  to	  evolution,	  especially	  human	  evolution,	  than	  the	  neo-­‐Darwinism	  
implicit	  in	  the	  Evolutionary	  Psychiatry	  I	  have	  been	  criticising	  is	  provided	  by	  Developmental	  Systems	  
Theory	  (DST)	  (Gray	  and	  Griffiths	  1994;	  Oyama,	  Griffiths	  and	  Gray	  2001).	  DST	  sees	  evolution	  not	  as	  a	  
sequence	  of	  statically	  defined	  things	  (adult	  organisms	  or	  genomes)	  but	  as	  a	  series	  of	  cycles	  of	  
development,	  which	  also	  involve	  the	  assembly	  of	  the	  resources	  necessary	  for	  the	  next	  cycle.	  These	  
resources	  certainly	  include	  genes,	  but	  also	  features	  of	  the	  ‘environment’	  from	  multiple	  features	  of	  
cellular	  chemistry	  and	  structure	  beyond	  the	  mere	  sequence	  of	  nucleotides	  in	  the	  genome,	  to	  nests,	  
dams	  or	  hospitals.	  	  In	  the	  human	  case	  a	  central	  aspect	  of	  the	  developmental	  niche	  is	  technology.	  	  
The	  emphasis	  on	  technology	  fits	  nicely	  with	  an	  important	  topic	  in	  recent	  evolutionary	  theory,	  niche	  
construction	  (Odling-­‐Smee,	  Laland	  and	  Feldman	  2003).	  	  Emphasising	  a	  feature	  of	  evolutionary	  
thinking	  that	  was	  classically	  elaborated	  in	  Darwin’s	  work	  on	  earthworms	  (Darwin	  1881),	  the	  concept	  
of	  niche	  construction	  captures	  the	  way	  that	  organisms	  do	  not	  merely	  evolve	  to	  adapt	  to	  a	  pre-­‐
existing	  environment,	  but	  also	  shape	  the	  environment	  to	  fit	  with	  their	  evolved	  needs.	  	  A	  glance	  at	  
contemporary	  human	  environments	  makes	  the	  relevance	  of	  this	  point	  obvious.	  	  Indeed,	  few	  humans	  
could	  survive	  at	  all	  outside	  the	  elaborate	  contexts	  that	  they	  have	  constructed	  for	  themselves.	  	  And	  
this	  is	  not	  merely	  a	  matter	  of	  constructing	  environments	  suited	  to	  the	  thriving	  of	  humans	  as	  they	  
have	  come	  to	  be.	  	  Within	  the	  perspective	  of	  DST	  it	  is	  clear	  that	  technology,	  by	  changing	  the	  
conditions	  under	  which	  humans	  can	  develop,	  can	  itself	  provide	  real	  changes	  in	  human	  evolution.	  	  I	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would	  argue	  that	  technologies	  from	  clean	  water	  and	  drainage	  to	  rapid	  transport,	  computers,	  or	  
mobile	  phones	  provide	  just	  such	  potential	  agents	  of	  evolutionary	  change.	  
One	  other	  widely	  discussed	  feature	  of	  human	  evolution	  is	  the	  importance	  of	  cultural	  transmission.	  	  
Most	  of	  human	  behaviour	  is	  learned	  from	  parents,	  peers,	  teachers,	  or	  other	  role	  models.	  
Innovations	  in	  behaviour,	  often	  connected	  to	  new	  technologies,	  can	  spread	  rapidly	  through	  human	  
populations,	  sometimes	  within	  the	  time	  frame	  of	  a	  single	  generation.	  	  It	  is	  sometimes	  objected	  that	  
such	  changes	  should	  not	  count	  as	  evolutionary	  because	  of	  their	  potential	  impermanence.	  	  But	  I	  can	  
see	  no	  force	  to	  this	  point.	  	  There	  is	  no	  theoretical	  reason	  why	  rapid	  transport,	  say,	  should	  not	  remain	  
a	  feature	  of	  human	  existence	  for	  another	  million	  years	  nor,	  for	  that	  matter,	  why	  we	  should	  not	  be	  
wiped	  out	  by	  familiar	  biological	  forces	  next	  week.	  	  Generally,	  the	  attempt	  to	  find	  something	  
conceptually	  unique	  about	  genetic	  transmission	  seems	  increasingly	  unpromising,	  an	  observation	  
that	  is	  in	  fact	  central	  to	  the	  widespread	  acceptance	  of	  DST	  by	  philosophers	  of	  biology.	  
The	  rejection	  of	  the	  privileged	  status	  of	  genetic	  transmission,	  finally,	  completely	  undermines	  the	  
standard	  Evolutionary	  Psychological	  argument	  for	  privileging	  the	  conditions	  of	  the	  Pleistocene	  in	  
understanding	  human	  evolution.	  	  The	  human	  environment	  has	  changed	  massively	  and	  dramatically	  
in	  the	  last	  11,000	  years,	  the	  Holocene,	  as	  has	  the	  variety	  of	  human	  behaviour.	  	  At	  some	  level	  of	  
abstraction	  there	  are	  no	  doubt	  neural	  structures	  that	  have	  remained	  pretty	  much	  the	  same	  over	  this	  
period,	  many	  of	  which	  date	  from	  far	  earlier	  periods	  than	  the	  Pleistocene.	  	  Similarly	  much	  basic	  
metabolic	  chemistry	  has	  remained	  largely	  unchanged	  for	  much	  of	  the	  history	  of	  life,	  but	  no	  one	  
supposes	  that	  this	  is	  the	  right	  level	  of	  abstraction	  to	  understand	  general	  morphology	  or	  physiology.	  	  
It	  is	  worth	  mentioning	  that	  as	  well	  as	  genetic	  and	  cultural	  transmission,	  there	  has	  recently	  been	  an	  
explosion	  of	  interest	  in	  epigenetic	  transmission,	  heritable	  changes	  to	  the	  genome	  that	  do	  not	  involve	  
changes	  to	  nucleotide	  sequence	  (Jablonka	  and	  Lamb	  1995,	  2005).	  	  The	  diversity	  of	  kinds	  of	  change	  
and	  modes	  of	  transmission	  that	  can	  be	  involved	  in	  human	  evolution	  makes	  the	  Evolutionary	  
Psychologists’	  obsession	  with	  genetic	  evolution	  in	  the	  Pleistocene	  entirely	  without	  defensible	  
rationale.	  
Human	  Nature	  as	  a	  Process	  
Evolutionary	  Psychology	  offers	  us	  a	  theory	  of	  a	  universal	  human	  nature.	  	  Even	  if	  this	  particular	  
approach	  is	  misguided,	  there	  remains	  a	  widespread	  intuition	  that	  there	  must	  be	  some	  such	  human	  
nature,	  and	  that	  discovering	  what	  this	  is	  must	  be	  the	  key	  to	  understanding	  the	  deviations	  from	  it	  
that	  constitute	  psychopathology.	  	  The	  intuition	  is	  expressed	  by	  William	  James:	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“Why	  do	  we	  smile,	  when	  pleased,	  and	  not	  scowl?	  Why	  are	  we	  unable	  to	  talk	  to	  a	  crowd	  as	  we	  talk	  to	  
a	  single	  friend?	  Why	  does	  a	  particular	  maiden	  turn	  our	  wits	  so	  upside-­‐down?	  The	  common	  man	  can	  
only	  say,	  Of	  course	  we	  smile,	  of	  course	  our	  heart	  palpitates	  at	  the	  sight	  of	  the	  crowd,	  of	  course	  we	  
love	  the	  maiden,	  that	  beautiful	  soul	  clad	  in	  that	  perfect	  form,	  so	  palpably	  and	  flagrantly	  made	  for	  all	  
eternity	  to	  be	  loved!”	  	  William	  James	  (1890).	  Principles	  of	  Psychology.	  
The	  ‘of	  course’	  in	  this	  quote,	  I	  take	  it,	  points	  to	  the	  idea	  that	  this	  is	  just	  what	  people	  are	  like,	  
something	  that	  is	  just	  obvious	  to	  all	  of	  us,	  even	  the	  common	  man.	  	  These	  are	  commonplace	  remarks	  
about	  human	  nature.	  	  Such	  an	  appeal	  to	  human	  nature	  seems	  plausible	  because	  certain	  abstractions	  
across	  human	  behaviour	  seem	  both	  intuitively	  and	  evolutionarily	  inescapable:	  expression	  of	  
emotions	  (an	  element	  of	  sociality);	  interest	  in	  (usually)	  the	  opposite	  sex;	  etc.	  	  But	  once	  again,	  the	  
problem	  is	  with	  the	  level	  of	  abstraction.	  	  To	  know	  how	  real	  people	  will	  actually	  behave,	  we	  need	  to	  
know	  more	  specific	  facts	  about	  a	  particular	  cultural	  context	  or	  a	  particular	  individual.	  	  When	  we	  
smile,	  or	  which	  maidens	  turn	  our	  wits	  upside	  down,	  etc.,	  can	  vary	  greatly	  and	  change	  rapidly.	  The	  
most	  distinctive	  thing	  about	  human	  ‘nature’	  is	  its	  flexibility.	  	  And	  the	  specific,	  local	  level	  at	  which	  
behaviour	  is	  underdetermined	  is	  crucial	  for	  understanding	  human	  evolution.	  	  The	  level	  at	  which	  
behaviour	  is	  underdetermined	  by	  biologically	  inherited	  factors	  provides	  the	  material	  for	  cultural	  
evolution,	  and	  cultural	  evolution	  can	  produce	  profound	  changes	  in	  the	  developmental	  niche.	  	  
Through	  such	  processes	  changes	  in	  behaviour	  can	  be	  firmly	  entrenched	  in	  human	  lineages.	  
According	  to	  Cosmides	  and	  Tooby,	  ‘“Our	  modern	  skulls	  house	  a	  stone	  age	  mind”,	  (Cosmides	  and	  
Tooby	  1997).	  	  But	  this	  is	  just	  wrong.	  For	  one	  thing,	  according	  to	  many	  contemporary	  philosophers	  
from	  followers	  of	  Wittgenstein	  to	  various	  kinds	  of	  externalists	  and	  adherents	  of	  extended	  mind	  
theses,	  our	  skulls	  don’t	  house	  minds	  of	  any	  kind.	  The	  most	  that	  can	  be	  said	  with	  any	  confidence	  is	  
that	  our	  skulls	  house	  a	  partly	  stone	  age	  brain.	  	  I	  say	  ‘partly’,	  first,	  because	  much	  of	  the	  brain	  has	  a	  
history	  that	  goes	  back	  far	  beyond	  the	  Stone	  Age.	  	  This	  evolutionarily	  ancient	  structure	  may	  be	  said	  to	  
provide	  the	  physiological	  basis	  for	  the	  modern	  mind,	  and	  maybe	  even	  for	  Stone	  Age	  (or	  much	  
earlier)	  dispositions,	  provided	  these	  are	  described	  in	  a	  sufficiently	  broad	  and	  abstract	  way.	  	  But	  the	  
modern	  mind	  is	  codetermined	  by	  the	  context,	  especially	  social,	  in	  which	  it	  develops.	  	  And	  this	  
context,	  and	  the	  minds	  that	  have	  developed	  within	  it,	  have	  changed	  at	  a	  far	  greater	  rate	  than	  
genetic	  evolution	  alone	  could	  allow.	  
Human	  nature	  is	  generally	  understood	  as	  a	  common	  property	  of	  all	  humans.	  	  But	  there	  are	  also	  the	  
particular	  natures	  of	  individual	  humans.	  	  I	  suggest	  that	  one	  way	  of	  thinking	  more	  clearly	  about	  both	  
these	  topics	  is	  to	  understand	  them	  as	  processes.	  	  It	  is	  uncontroversial,	  of	  course,	  that	  whatever	  
universal	  human	  nature	  there	  may	  be	  at	  any	  time	  is	  always	  evolving,	  and	  hence	  is	  a	  developing	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process	  not	  a	  static	  thing.	  	  My	  argument	  here	  has	  been	  that	  many	  theorists,	  including	  some	  
Evolutionary	  Psychiatrists,	  have	  entirely	  misconstrued	  the	  rate	  of	  change	  of	  this	  process.	  	  To	  
whatever	  extent	  there	  is,	  nonetheless,	  a	  universal	  human	  nature	  at	  a	  time,	  what	  it	  contributes	  to	  
individual	  humans	  is	  just	  one	  of	  a	  number	  of	  developmental	  resources.	  	  Individual	  human	  nature	  is	  
then	  a	  process	  of	  development	  in	  which	  these	  resources	  interact	  with	  a	  wide	  range	  of	  environmental	  
conditions	  and	  contingencies	  to	  produce	  the	  particular	  nature—habits,	  dispositions,	  etc.—of	  the	  
individual	  human.	  This	  nature	  is	  itself	  subject	  to	  continuous	  change	  and	  development	  over	  the	  life	  
course.	  	  Except	  in	  cases	  of	  extreme	  dysfunction,	  trying	  to	  understand	  this	  process	  in	  terms	  of	  
something	  as	  static	  as	  gene	  sequence	  is	  bound	  to	  fail.	  The	  clearest	  empirical	  observation	  about	  
evolved	  human	  nature,	  to	  repeat,	  is	  its	  perhaps	  unique	  flexibility.	  
I	  must	  leave	  it	  to	  psychiatrists	  themselves	  to	  decide	  whether	  this	  perspective	  is	  helpful	  in	  
understanding	  mental	  illness.	  	  It	  is	  uncontentious	  that	  mental	  illness	  is	  a	  developmental	  outcome,	  so	  
it	  seems	  likely	  that	  a	  clearer	  view	  of	  the	  nature	  of	  human	  development	  is	  the	  best	  resource	  for	  a	  
proper	  conceptual	  grasp	  of	  the	  causes	  and	  character	  of	  psychopathology.	  	  At	  the	  very	  least,	  it	  should	  
be	  clear	  that	  reflection	  on	  Stone	  Age	  life	  is	  an	  unpromising	  path	  for	  gaining	  insights	  into	  psychiatry.	  	  
Much	  more	  generally,	  we	  should	  be	  extremely	  wary	  of	  inferring	  from	  the	  fact	  that	  a	  theoretical	  
perspective	  can	  in	  principle	  be	  applied	  to	  a	  domain	  of	  enquiry	  that	  it	  will	  be	  useful	  to	  do	  so.	  	  It	  is	  
undoubtedly	  true	  that	  our	  minds	  evolved.	  But	  whether	  the	  models	  of	  evolutionary	  process	  that	  have	  
proved	  useful	  in	  understanding	  many	  aspects	  of	  the	  history	  of	  life	  will	  be	  illuminating	  in	  
understanding	  this	  particular	  and	  perhaps	  unique	  episode	  in	  the	  history	  of	  life	  is	  another	  matter.	  	  
And	  indeed	  much	  experience	  to	  date	  suggests	  that	  such	  a	  strategy	  will	  provide	  more	  confusion	  than	  
illumination.	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